






INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION 
IN THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS
* 









Corresponding author: Joaquín Maudos, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, 
Guardia Civil, 22, Esc. 2, 1º, 46020-Valencia, Spain, joaquin.maudos@ivie.es. 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Junio 2003 
Depósito Legal: V-2873-2003 
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 
encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific journals for their final 
publication. 
 
                                                 
* The authors wish to thank the financial support of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología through 
projects SEC2001-2950 and SEC2002-03375. Joaquin Maudos also thanks the financial support of the 
BBVA Foundation. 
** J. Fernández de Guevara: Ivie; J. Maudos y F. Pérez: Ivie y Universitat de Valencia.      2
INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION 
IN THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Juan Fernández de Guevara, Joaquín Maudos and Francisco Pérez 
 
ABSTRACT 
Financial integration in Europe should affect the competition between markets 
and intermediaries and generate a convergence of both interest rates and margins among 
the different countries. This paper analyses the evolution of the convergence in interest 
rates and the level of competition and its inequalities among the European banking 
systems for the period 1993 to 2001. The inequality index used –the Theil index- allows 
us to break down the inequalities so that the importance of either a country effect or a 
specialization effect is quantified. If the former effect dominates it would mean that the 
national banking markets are segmented as a consequence of the existence of obstacles 
or barriers to the integration. On the other hand, the dominance of the latter effect would 
be related to the different level of competition depending on the type of banking 
specialization. 
Keywords: integration, competition, European financial markets 
JEL classification: F36, G15 
 
RESUMEN 
La integración financiera en Europa debe producir efectos sobre la competencia 
entre mercados e intermediarios (reducción de precios, costes de intermediación y 
márgenes) y generar convergencia en tipos de interés y márgenes entre países. Este 
trabajo analiza la evolución de la convergencia en tipos de interés y el nivel de 
competencia en los sectores bancarios europeos en el periodo 1993-2001. Además, se 
estudia el grado de desigualdad de los niveles de competencia mediante la aplicación 
del índice de Theil. Este índice permite la descomposición de la desigualdad de forma 
que se cuantifica la importancia de tanto efectos país como efectos especialización. Si 
los primeros dominasen querría decir que los mercados bancarios nacionales estarían 
segmentados como consecuencia de la existencia de barreras u obstáculos a la 
integración. Por otro lado, si dominasen los efectos especialización, el nivel de 
competencia dependería del tipo de especialización bancaria. 
Palabras clave: integración, competencia, mercados financieros europeos. 
 
      3
1. Introduction 
Monetary as well as financial integration are essential aspects of what is the 
actual economic integration in Europe and for the exploitation of its potential 
advantages. Both are interrelated a priori given that the existence of a common currency 
should contribute to the integration of the financial markets (banking and capital 
markets). Similarly, financial integration does not only condition European integration 
in general, it in turn is also conditioned by the process of unification in other economic 
as well as extra economic aspects (cultural and political). 
The awaited benefits of integration for financial service consumers have recently 
been synthesized from a macro economic perspective by Heinemann and Joop (2002).  
For the consumers, this ought to mean a broader range of assets and services to choose 
from, a reduction in prices resulting from the intensification of competition, and an 
improvement in the portfolio composition. At a macro level, in line with other papers 
(King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, Levine and 
Loayza (2000), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Levine and Zervos (1998), Cetorelli 
and Gambera (2001)), the effects of integration are the cause of developments in the 
financial markets, stimulating saving and capital accumulation, and improving the 
efficiency of the allocation of resources and the financing of technological innovations 
which, in the end, boost income and employment growth. 
Since the appearance of the first evaluations of the potential contributions of 
integration to improving the working of the European economy and those of its member 
countries (for example, the Cecchini Report, the European Community Commission, 
1988), rather important changes have taken place, especially in the monetary and 
financial spheres, both inside and outside the EU, which allow us to determine whether 
clear progress is being made in the direction initially targeted
1: 
a)  Amongst those decisions taken within the EU, the most obvious is the 
creation of the single currency, adopted by eleven countries in 1999 (and 
Greece in 2001), and put into movement in 2002. Also significant are the free 
movement of capital and the second banking directive (1993), and the 
compromises of nominal convergence that preceded the introduction of the 
                                                 
1 More recently, in February 2002, a new study commissioned by the European Round Table (Heinemann 
and Jopp, 2002: Gyllenhammer report) suggested that potencial for higher growth through financial 
integration could be up to 0.5%-0.7% of GDP per annum.      4
Euro (1996). More recently, in 1999, the European Commission approved the 
Financial Services Action Plan. The FSAP is a set of measures to be 
developed in the period 1999-2005 which aims to: a) create a single 
wholesale financial market, b) open up the retail markets and make them 
more secure, and c) seriously revise and homogenize the financial regulations 
of the member states. 
b)  With regard to changes in the financial environment in general in which the 
EU economies have participated, it is important to remember that, above all, 
the nineties witnessed an acceleration of financial integration on a world 
scale propelled in part by the development of information and 
communication technology (ICT). This autonomous factor, independent of 
the European construction, is mainly reflected in the integration of the capital 
markets in terms of both the flow among these and the synchronized 
evolution of their stock market value. 
One of the expected benefits of integration, on a micro as well as a macro scale, 
is the cheapening of financial prices resulting from the intensification of competition. 
However, it is only when integration results in a genuine increase in competition that it 
becomes tangible and can provide all the potential benefits. For that reason, it is very 
important to analyse the evolution of competition in the financial markets to check 
whether the process of integration is giving the expected results in terms of welfare. 
This paper analyses the evolution of the convergence in interest rates and the 
level of competition, starting from the construction of a synthetic indicator of 
competition for the banking firms. The causes of the inequality in the competition levels 
associated with different types of barriers to the integration and competition, which is 
an important issue for the design of the economic policy, is analysed based on this 
indicator. Thus, the persistence of differences in the level of competition between 
countries can be due to the existence of entry barriers or obstacles of different type 
(natural, policy-induced, etc.) that protect banking firms against the foreign competition. 
By breaking down the inequalities using the Theil index, the importance of a possible 
country effect is quantified (which would mean that the national banking markets are 
segmented as a consequence of the existence of obstacles to the integration) and also of 
a specialization effect (related to different level of competition depending on the type of 
banking specialization). These different sources of inequality are relevant to evaluate if 
the European initiatives aiming to achieve greater financial integration are resulting in 
higher levels of competition and lesser differences between countries, and also to 
consider to what extent convergence towards the “one price law” can be expected.      5
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 contains an analysis of the 
evolution of the interest rates of the different countries with the aim of evaluating 
whether or not their trajectories are converging at aggregate price levels distinguishing 
the behaviour of the wholesale and retail (banking) markets. Section 3 describes the 
methodology used for estimating the level of competition or market power of the 
banking firms, and reports the empirical results for the banking sectors of the European 
Union. Based on the indicator of competition, and using the Theil index, section 4 
analyses the origin of the inequalities in the levels of competition, showing the 
importance of a country effect and a specialization effect as proxy’s variables to the 
entry barriers. Section 5 details the conclusions reached. 
2.  Integration and convergence in interest rates 
The Cecchini Report (1998) characterized a situation of complete financial 
integration based on the hypothesis of a levelling of asset and financial service prices.  
In a scenario of perfect mobility of capital, this law of one price should result, under 
identical conditions of risk and maturity of the operations, in the levelling of interest 
rates, but not so when these conditions are not the same. Thus, the greater the extent to 
which such circumstances are approximated, the greater the convergence in the interest 
rates, especially in markets where the homogeneity of the products and the operations is 
closer. 
Nevertheless, although the majority of the change factors mentioned previously 
may have boosted the conditions that favour interest rate convergence both at a 
macroeconomic level and at a microeconomic level, the circumstances of the agents 
may continue to differ –between countries and within each country- and, although the 
intensification of competition ought to reduce margins and prices to a certain degree, the 
law of one price may not be a feasible goal (Limier and Sander, 2002). This is even 
more likely to be the case if risk differences (associated with the characteristics of the 
clients and the operations) and cultural differences remain, not to mention bank-client 
relationships involving long-term strategies (based on the information imperfections 
typical of banking markets
2. 
                                                 
2  See Scholtens and van Wensveen , 2000; and Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001. 
      6
The empirical evidence on interest rate convergence presented here is based on a 
dispersion measure popularised by growth economics, σ -convergence (Barro and Sala-i-
Martín, 1992), used to analyse whether economies approach the same income per capita 
when they reach their steady state. Such growth models consider that there may exist 
circumstances which propel each economy to converge to its own steady state 
(conditional convergence) if they differ in a number of fundamental parameters. The 
analogy for interest rate convergence consists of considering that economies may 
contain characteristics, in their microeconomic units that could explain a limited, or 
conditional, convergence in market prices. 
The data used comes from the statistics of the European Central Bank. The 
limitations of the information for this period have meant a reduction in the number of 
countries considered in order to guarantee the homogeneity of the sample and avoid 
affecting the significance of the exercises
3. The period considered is from 1993, in 
which crucial changes occurred, to 2001, the last year available. 
Seven interest rates are considered: two corresponding to the public debt markets 
(3-year government debt yield and long-term government debt yield in national 
markets) and five to the banking markets (time deposits, mortgage loans to households, 
consumer loans, short-term loans to enterprises and long-term loans to enterprises). 
With regard to the evolution of interest rates, the free movement of capital and 
the implementation of the second banking directive (1993) mark the end of a period of 
greater instability and the beginning of another characterized by the reduction of 
nominal interest rates. Parallel to the fall in interest rates is a reduction in the dispersion 
(measured by the standard deviation) of the nominal interest rates of the different 
countries (figure 1). Towards the end of the period one can observe that the inequality 
between the countries is very much reduced in the interest rates of the public debt 
markets (wholesale markets) but are greater in the rates corresponding to the banking 
markets (retail markets).  
Within the banking markets, different degrees of convergence intensity in the 
interest rates are detected at the end of the period: greater convergence occurring 
                                                 
3  In each figure standard deviation is computed only for those countries with information available for 
the whole sample period.  Figure 1. s-convergence of selected interes rates. European Union 
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amongst the rates for products with a limited margin for the differentiation of operation 
characteristics (time deposits and mortgage loans to households) and greater inequality 
in the operations in which more product differentiation exists (consumer loans, short-
term loans to enterprises and long-term loans to enterprises). 
Given the notable differences in size amongst the EU countries, it is not of the 
same importance that the large countries are the most similar or are approximating to a 
greater extent, as the small countries. When the interest rates are weighted for country 
size to calculate the dispersion indicators, it is observed that the starting inequalities 
were less and, above all, there is a substantial reduction in the inequality of medium and 
long-term enterprise loan interest rates. All seems to indicate that it is the small 
countries which produce a large share of the inequality, particularly in enterprise loans.  
The speed of convergence in the smaller countries is generally slower, totally 
disappearing at the consumer loan level.       
When real interest rates are used, it is observed that the initial differences were 
less than they appeared to be in nominal terms, and the rate at which convergence 
progresses is somewhat slower. This indicates that interest rate convergence is in part 
affected by the process of convergence of inflation rates, developed in preparation for 
the adoption of the Euro as the single currency, making the real convergence of interest 
rates somewhat less than the nominal one. Similarly, when weighted standard deviations 
are considered two things occur: the inequality level is reduced, but in two of the retail 
markets, short-term loans to firms and consumer loans, there is no convergence 
whatsoever.  
To summarize, the evidence with respect to interest rate convergence presented 
above provides a number of interesting results.  Firstly, convergence has taken place but 
this is due to a large extent to the reduction in the inflation differentials and to the 
general drop in nominal interest rates. Secondly, convergence has been greater in those 
financial products that are more homogenous among countries thanks to nominal 
convergence and the monetary union -such as the public debt markets, time deposits and 
mortgage loans to households-, resulting in their corresponding markets becoming more 
contestable. Thirdly, when country size is taken into consideration, it is observed that 
the initial inequalities were generally smaller because they were in part derived from the 
disparities in the small countries, this effect being most noticeable in the case of 
medium and long-term loans to enterprises that have also clearly converged.  Finally, in 
certain retail markets (consumer loans and short-term loans to enterprises) convergence 
proceeds with much more difficulty and greater inequalities remain between these 
interest rates. This result suggests two alternative (non exclusive) hypotheses 
surrounding the persistence of these  differences  in  banking activity: that in such   9
activities exist market power or that they are derived of a greater heterogeneity of 
operations (and clients) that have not been reduced, and to which the following section 
is dedicated.   
3.  Competition in banking markets 
The persistence of a wider range of interest rates in several of the banking 
markets may be the result of a lesser degree of competition in these, due to the existence 
of obstacles or barriers to the financial integration. For that reason, this section 
evaluates whether the set of circumstances that have accompanied the liberalization 
measures tending to the creation of a single market have caused variations in the 
differences in the degree of competition among the different banking industries of the 
European Union, and for this purpose Lerner indices were calculated from the 
estimation of marginal costs and prices.  
3.1.  The Lerner index 
The estimation of Lerner indices has been widely used in the banking sector as 
indicators of degrees of market power.  Some of the most important studies in this area 
are Shaffer (1993) for Canadian banks, Ribon & Yosha (1999) for the case of Israel, 
Angelini & Cetorelli (1999) for Italian banks, Maudos & Pérez (2001) for the Spanish 
banking sector, and Fernández de Guevara et al. (2002) for a sample of countries of the 
European Union. 
In the case of banking firms, the model most often used as a reference from 
which a Lerner index expression is obtained is the Monti-Klein imperfect competition 
model
4. This model examines the behaviour of a monopolistic bank faced with a deposit 
supply curve of positive slope D(rD) and a loan demand curve of negative slope L(rL). 
The decision variables of the bank are D (volume of deposits) and L (volume of loans), 
and for simplicity's sake the level of capital is assumed to be given. The bank is 
assumed to be a price taker in the inter-bank market (r), so that the objective function of 
profits to be maximised is as follows: 
() () ( ) () ( ) D L C D D r r L r L r D L D L , ) , ( − − + − = Π = Π     (1) 
                                                 
4 Monti (1972) and Klein (1971). See a survey in Freixas and Rochet (1997).  10
so that profit is the net interest income between deposits and loans, after deducting the 
transformation costs C(L,D). The first order conditions with respect to deposits and 
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eD and eL being the elasticities of demand for deposits and loans, respectively. 
The Lerner index for expression (3) represents the extent to which the 
monopolist's market power allows it to fix a price above marginal cost, expressed as 
proportional to the price (relative margin).  In the case of perfect competition, the value 
of the index is zero, there being no monopoly power. Starting from this extreme case, 
the lower the elasticity of demand, the greater the monopoly power to fix a price above 
the marginal cost. The relative margin (Lerner index) informs of the level of efficiency 
reached in the market and is therefore a suitable candidate for analysing the evolution of 
competition.   
The extension of the model to the case of an oligopoly (N banks) provides the 
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which differs from the case of monopoly only in that the elasticities are multiplied by 
the number of firms (N). With this simple adaptation, the Monti-Klein model can be  11
reinterpreted as a model of imperfect competition with two extreme cases: monopoly 
(N=1) and perfect competition (N=infinity). 
3.2. Empirical  approach:  results 
The database does not provide sufficiently detailed information about the profit 
and loss account for the calculation of separate prices for deposits and loans
5. 
Consequently, we use a single indicator of banking activity in the empirical model of 
this study and, as in Shaffer (1993) and Berg and Kim (1994), banking output is proxied 
by the total assets of each firm. The starting assumption is that the flow of banking 
goods and services produced by a bank is proportional to its total assets. With this 
approximation, an average price (that includes interest and non-interest income) and a 
marginal cost (financial and operating cost) for the banking output is computed, 
estimating the Lerner according to the following expression:  
[ ] p MC
p
−
         
(5) 
where p is the average output price and MC is the total marginal cost. 
The calculation of marginal costs is based on the usual specification of a 
translogarithmic cost function where as a measure of production we use total assets and 
three inputs prices (price of labour, price of capital and price of deposits) are computed. 
The estimation of the costs function (and hence of the marginal costs) is done separately 
for each country, allowing the parameters of the cost function to vary from one country 
to another to reflect different technologies.  Fixed effects are also introduced in order to 
capture the influence of variables specific to each firm. Finally, a trend is included to 
reflect the effect of technical change, which translates into movements of the cost 
function over time. As usual, the estimation is made under the imposition of restrictions 
of symmetry and of grade one homogeneity in input prices. 
To estimate Lerner indices data were obtained in a standardised fashion from 
Bankscope database (Bureau Van Dijk). The sample includes the fifteen banking sectors 
of the European Union for the period 1993-2000. The criterion for banks to be included 
in the sample is that information must be available on all the variables necessary for the 
                                                 
5 In the case of loans, the profit and loss account does not give the financial income associated with these 
separately, it appears jointly with other financial products (fixed income investments, for example). In the 
case of deposits, the financial costs are included with those of other liability products.  
  12
estimation of the Lerner index. In addition, input price data required for the cost 
function estimation should lie within 2.5 standard errors away from their mean values in 
each year. Using this data selection criterion, the sample consists of a total of 18,330 
observations of non-consolidated banking firms (see table 1). 
Table 1. Number of banks by country 
 
Table 2 shows the evolution of the Lerner index for the 15 EU countries from 
1993 to 2000. For the weighted average of the EU, the Lerner index has shown a slight 
increase or the whole period, being the value in 2000 (0.145) 10% greater than the 
corresponding to 1993 (0.132). 
By countries, the market power has increased in ten out of the fifteen countries 
of the EU. In the last year considered (2000), the Lerner index was placed in amounts 
higher than 20% in Finland, UK, Italy and Spain, placing in the opposite extreme 
Luxembourg, Denmark and Germany as the most competitive banking sectors. 
The conclusion drawn from the evolution of the Lerner index is that, in spite of 
the deregulating measures implemented in the last years, the competitive conditions 
have not intensified in the major part of the banking sector of the EU.  This result agrees 
with the evidence obtained in other papers. De Bandt and Davis (2000) and Corvoisier 
and Gropp (2002) show that in the main European countries and in some banking 
products there existed situations of monopolistic competition in the 1990s, and the 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 59 68 72 75 118 128 127 116
Belgium 43 44 47 53 48 39 37 33
Germany 1.015 1.303 1.492 1.559 1.548 1.611 1.516 1.145
Denmark 46 47 50 49 45 42 39 37
Spain 62 60 58 59 59 57 62 65
Finland 6789 1 2 1 4 1 17
France 219 210 223 224 228 215 211 184
United Kingdom 42 48 47 54 42 40 44 42
Greece 22554-24
Ireland --355657
Italy 103 111 140 303 332 342 370 346
Luxembourg 65 67 69 75 62 59 66 67
Netherlands 13 18 20 19 21 16 16 15
Portugal 19 17 23 24 27 28 29 23
Sweden 8 8 12 15 13 12 10 12
European Union 1.702 2.010 2.269 2.528 2.564 2.609 2.545 2.103
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk). 13
 
Table 2. Evolution of the Lerner index by country 
 
monopoly situation was even accepted by banks that acted in small markets. Bikker and 
Haaf (2002) also offer proof in favour of the existence of monopolistic competition in a 
wide sample of countries (European and non-European), competition being weaker in 
local markets and stronger in international markets
6.  
One of the possible causes of the differences in the competition levels observed 
between countries is the specialization in a given banking business area. In as much as 
the importance of the barriers to the integration and the competition is different 
depending on the type of banking business (retail banks, universal banks, investment 
banks, etc), productive specialisation could explain the differences in competition 
among countries. In other words, the level of competition can differ among countries on 
the basis of the relative weight of banks with different productive specialisation. 
                                                 
6 De Bandt and Davis (2000) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) measure competition using the Panzar-Rosse  
model. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) analise whether the increase in concentration (due to the recent wave 
of mergers in the euro area) has offset the increase in competition in European banking through 
deregulation by estimating a simple Cournot model or bank pricing. 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 0,1050 0,1099 0,1176 0,1334 0,1360 0,1460 0,1212 0,1348
Belgium 0,0856 0,0824 0,0959 0,1033 0,1160 0,1424 0,1432 0,1334
Germany 0,1286 0,1365 0,1275 0,1312 0,1276 0,1192 0,1146 0,1063
Denmark 0,1285 0,1585 0,1312 0,1380 0,1305 0,1183 0,1241 0,1006
Spain 0,1596 0,1436 0,1378 0,1454 0,1709 0,1862 0,2117 0,2086
Finland 0,1355 0,1228 0,0993 0,1780 0,2268 0,2416 0,2373 0,2729
France 0,1174 0,1081 0,0962 0,1007 0,1063 0,1131 0,1347 0,1287
United Kingdom 0,2025 0,1937 0,1857 0,2151 0,1757 0,1944 0,2273 0,2355
Greece 0,0777 0,1114 0,0763 0,0848 0,1198 - 0,2180 0,1988
Ireland - - 0,1585 0,1965 0,1677 0,2053 0,1095 0,0889
Italy 0,1443 0,0903 0,1238 0,1329 0,1314 0,1929 0,2034 0,2135
Japan 0,1184 0,1219 0,1793 0,1871 0,1961 0,2258 0,2336 0,2810
Luxembourg 0,1198 0,1021 0,1099 0,1188 0,1122 0,1302 0,1116 0,0969
Netherlands 0,0688 0,0802 0,0808 0,0898 0,0949 0,0978 0,1122 0,1120
Portugal 0,1643 0,1400 0,1182 0,1521 0,1755 0,1958 0,2050 0,1809
Sweden 0,1505 0,1523 0,1834 0,1876 0,1534 0,1496 0,1161 0,1145
European Union 0,1322 0,1267 0,1222 0,1310 0,1306 0,1401 0,1466 0,1452
Source: Own elaboration. 14
The analysis of the importance of specialisation in the explanation of the 
differences of market power between countries requires dividing the sample companies 
into groups of banks with a similar banking orientation. Using cluster techniques, we 
identify banking groups of similar specialisation
7. The criterion used to determine the 
clusters is to group firms in accordance with some measurement of their distance from 
certain individual characteristics, each group being as different as possible from the 
others. The variables chosen for grouping banking firms were: loans, other earning 
assets, fixed assets, deposits, other sources of funding and equity, all of them expressed 
as ratios of total assets.  
The cluster methodology enables us to detect four productive specialisation 
groups
8 (table 3): 
* Cluster 1: Retail banks.  This cluster groups 1,322 firms representing 23% of 
the sample in terms of total assets in 2000. This group, formed mainly by 
savings banks and commercial banks, is financed mainly through deposits 
(81%), distributing its resources between, mainly, loans (64%) and other earning 
assets (31%).  
* Cluster 2: Investment banks.  This group captures the major part (73%) of its 
resources in the deposit market, but devotes most of them (68%) to earning 
assets other than loans.  330 banks are included here representing 22% of the 
sample. 
* Cluster 3: Universal banks. This group is characterised by financing itself 
mainly by the capturing of deposits (61% of total assets), though they diversify 
their asset portfolio to a greater extent between loans (44%) and other earning 
assets (47%).  The total number of banks contained in CL3 is 369, it being the 
most important group in terms of total assets (43% of the sample). 
* Cluster 4: Specialised banks. This cluster contains only 82 banks of the sample 
(mainly real estate/mortgage banks and medium and long-term credit banks).  It 
is financed by means of instruments other than deposits and devotes its resources 
to granting loans (65%) and other earning assets (31%).  
 
                                                 
7 See more details in Maudos, Pastor and Perez (2002). 
8 For this purpose we used a non-hierarchical method (k-means), though a hierarchical one (Ward) was 
first used to determine the number of clusters.   15
Table 3. Specialization groups in the European Banking sectors. 2000. 
Percentage over total assets 
 
The calculation of the Lerner index for each cluster (table 4) shows that the 
differences between these clusters are substantial, especially those between retail banks 
and specialised banks. The averages of the relative margins between investment banks 
and specialised banks and between universal banks and retail banks are much more 
similar, the convergence of the last two clusters being considerable. In general terms, 
the relative margins are not experiencing any notable changes, with the exception of the 
universal banks where the Lerner index has increased by two percentage points. Given 
the specialisation profile of each cluster, the results show that the banks in which the 
traditional deposits-and-loans activity  holds greater weight, work with greater 









Loans 63,95 25,09 44,08 65,43 46,87
Other earning assets 30,70 67,99 47,28 31,33 46,25
Total earning assets 94,66 93,08 91,35 96,76 93,12
Fixed assets 1,67 0,62 0,68 0,25 0,85
Non earning assets 3,67 6,30 7,96 2,99 6,03
Total assets 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Total deposits 80,98 72,68 61,11 21,08 63,65
Total money market funding 4,37 5,10 8,26 6,16 6,42
Customer and short term funding 84,49 76,91 68,86 24,10 69,10
Other funding 6,67 8,78 14,53 69,16 17,72
Other (non interest bearing) 3,54 8,34 9,80 2,87 7,24
Loan loss reserves 0,01 0,05 0,06 0,10 0,05
Other reserves 0,23 2,14 2,15 0,05 1,47
Equity 5,06 3,79 4,59 3,72 4,42
Income statement
Interest income 5,56 5,23 5,25 6,04 5,41
Interest expense 3,49 4,45 4,04 5,28 4,15
Net interest income 2,06 0,78 1,21 0,76 1,26
Other operating income 0,81 0,93 1,01 0,25 0,86
Gross income 2,87 1,71 2,23 1,00 2,12
Overheads 1,85 1,10 1,42 0,51 1,35
Personnel expenses 1,03 0,58 0,79 0,23 0,73
Other administrative expenses 0,67 0,45 0,54 0,25 0,52
Goodwill write-off 0,22 0,09 0,11 0,06 0,12
Net income 1,02 0,61 0,80 0,49 0,77
Profit before tax 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00
Number of firms 1322 330 369 82 2103
% total assets 22,96 22,24 43,31 11,49 100,00
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 16
margins and these tend to increase in relative terms (especially in retail banks). On the 
other hand, in the two groups of banks which are more orientated towards the wholesale 
market and in the specialised banks (in mortgage loans and in public sector financing, 
markets in which interest rate convergence was observed to be greater), the margins are 
less and getting smaller.  
Table 4. Evolution of the Lerner index by clusters 
 
4.  Inequalities in the level of competition 
One of the reasons that justify the existence of a low degree of integration in 
retail banking markets compared with wholesale markets is the existence of barriers or 
obstacles associated with factors such as the importance of proximity, the banking 
relationship, the local area of information, etc. The greater the importance of these 
barriers, the lesser the pressure of competition on the national markets and, 
consequently, the more segmented the markets will be. 
The results obtained in the previous section have revealed the existence of 
important inequalities in the level of competition or market power among the banking 
sectors of the EU.  With the purpose of going deeply into the analysis of the inequalities 
in the competition levels, figure 2 shows the evolution of the standard deviation of the 
Lerner index (σ -convergence) calculated at the firm level for the whole sample. The 
figure shows that far from producing a σ -convergence phenomenon, the inequalities in 
market power have risen during the 90´s, increasing the standard deviation by 9% from 
1993 to 2000. 
With the objective of taking into account the different size of the banking firms 
and to amend a possible bias in the σ -convergence measurement, figure 2 also contains 
the evolution of the weighted standard deviation of the Lerner index, using as weights 
the total assets of each bank in the sample. The figure shows, once again, an increase in 
the inequalities in the market power within the European Union, raising the standard 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Retail Banks 0,1632 0,1727 0,1652 0,1741 0,1736 0,1649 0,1761 0,1750
Investment Banks 0,1244 0,1056 0,1012 0,1034 0,1036 0,1162 0,1200 0,1191
Universal Banks 0,1299 0,1191 0,1181 0,1316 0,1351 0,1515 0,1578 0,1558
Specialised Banks 0,1066 0,1099 0,1063 0,1123 0,1125 0,1084 0,1115 0,0961
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk). 17
deviation by 36%. Consequently, upon using the weighted standard deviation, the 
divergence has become even more marked, existing in the year 2000 a inequality level 
superior to one obtained using the non-weighted standard deviation. 
Figure 2. s-convergence in Lerner index. European Union 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
An important issue for the design of economic policy measures is the analysis of 
the causes or origin of the inequality in the competition levels associated with different 
types of barriers to the integration and competition. Thus, the persistence of differences 
in the level of competition between countries can be due to the existence of natural 
(differences in language, culture, etc.) and policy-induced (differences in tax treatment, 
portfolio restriction, regulation, etc.) barriers and/or, alternatively to these, to the typical 
circumstances of banking operations (banking relationship, the importance of proximity, 
information and supervision costs, etc.). Empirically, the natural and policy-induced 
barriers are reflected in the existence of a country effect (the country to which the entity 
belongs) while the importance of the barriers derived from the typical circumstances of 
banking operations are reflected in the existence of a specialisation effect (the cluster to 
which the entity belongs). 
To calculate the relative importance of a possible country effect or specialisation 
effect in explaining the origin of the inequalities of margins, a number of inequality 
indices will be used that may be decomposed into two components, one which measures 
internal or within-group inequality (in this case internal inequality within each country 
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inequality between countries or between specialised groups).  The index used will be 
the Theil index
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∑        ( 6 )  
where xi is the study variable, µ the weighted average of variable xi, pi the weight of 
each individual i in the total sample and β  a factor measuring the sensitivity of the index 
to transfers between individuals with values in high levels of xi to individuals with low 
level values. The index will be used in this work in the case where β =0
10, so that the 
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Let us suppose that the total sample may be separated into G groups, that each 
group represents a percentage pg of the total sample and that the weighted average of 
variable xi of each grouping is µ i. Then, the decomposition property of the family of 
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 ∑         ( 1 0 )  
                                                 
9 More details on different inequality measures and their properties may be found in Shorrocks (1980) 
and  Shorrocks (1984). 
10 The Theil index with β =0 is used because in doing so each one of the groups will be weighted by the 
proportion that the group represents of the total number of individuals, thus favouring the inequality of 
those groups which represent a greater percentage of the total sample. 
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is the external inequality (between groups) index between groupings. 
Thus, the decomposition of the Theil index defined by equations (8)-(10) will be 
calculated for the Lerner index of the banking companies in the sample. The weights to 
be used (pi and pg) will be the percentage in terms of assets that each entity (or group) 
represents of the total sample. 
To analyse whether such differences exist more between firms or between 
countries, a Theil inequality index is calculated for the Lerner index (table 5). Its 
evolution also shows an increase in inequality in recent years. The main part of the 
inequality is within countries but the inequality between countries is also relevant and is 
growing in importance, representing one third of the total at the end of the period. This 
result indicates two things: a) the elimination of differences between countries would 
not eliminate the major percentage of inequality in the margins, which is internal, but b) 
removing the barriers which generate the portion of inequality which is external would 
be indeed a relevant objective of political economy. 
Table 5. Decomposition of the Theil index by country 
 
The decomposition of the within-cluster and between-cluster inequality by 
means of the Theil index (table 6) indicates that both are growing, but that the 
inequality between clusters is increasing at a faster rate and, consequently, its weight is 
growing. This result is in agreement with the disparate evolution of the margins of each 
group and with the growth of the Lerner index in the case of the universal banks. 
Nevertheless, the inequality between clusters is smaller than the inequality between 










1993 0,103 0,083 0,019 81,16 18,84
1994 0,117 0,093 0,024 79,38 20,62
1995 0,105 0,085 0,019 81,46 18,55
1996 0,121 0,097 0,024 80,09 19,92
1997 0,107 0,092 0,015 86,15 13,85
1998 0,100 0,074 0,026 73,99 26,01
1999 0,116 0,081 0,036 69,43 30,57
2000 0,143 0,092 0,051 64,40 35,59




Table 6. Decomposition of Theil index by cluster 
 
To analyse the relationship between specialisation and belonging to a particular 
country even further, one last decomposition of internal and external (between 
countries) inequality has been carried out for the banks of each cluster (table 7). The 
inequality between the entities of each cluster is growing in all the groups and in both 
indicators. The group with the greatest inequality in margins is the investment banks 
and the one with the least inequality, the retail banks. Furthermore, the results reinforce 
the notion that the differences between countries are indeed relevant in many of the 
specialisation groupings. The external inequalities are growing in all the groups with the 
exception of the investment banks, and are greatest of all in the case of the universal 
banks, where they represent two thirds of the inequality at the end of the period. 
To summarise, the analysis of banking relative margins and the inequalities to be 
found in these indicate the following. Firstly, it has been observed that the relative 
margin increases. Secondly, sizable margin inequalities between countries have been 
verified in the whole group of entities as well as in each specialisation grouping 
analysed. These differences are particularly high in the case of the universal banks. 
Thirdly, when the specialisation of the entities is considered, it is observed that the 
margins are less in those specialisations which are more connected with markets in 
which interest rates have converged more between countries (investment banks and 
specialised banks), and are greater in those which are more orientated towards deposits 










1993 0,103 0,094 0,009 91,56 8,44
1994 0,117 0,098 0,019 83,91 16,08
1995 0,105 0,087 0,017 83,45 16,55
1996 0,121 0,100 0,021 83,20 17,51
1997 0,107 0,090 0,017 84,27 15,71
1998 0,100 0,088 0,012 87,89 12,03
1999 0,116 0,103 0,014 88,24 11,76
2000 0,143 0,125 0,018 87,43 12,57
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk).
Theil index
Percentage over 
total Theil indexTable 7. Decomposition of Theil index by cluster and countries. Decomposition by country in each cluster 



















1993 0,051 0,042 0,010 81,04 18,96 1993 0,096 0,072 0,024 74,87 25,13
1994 0,047 0,040 0,007 84,86 15,14 1994 0,134 0,080 0,053 59,97 40,03
1995 0,045 0,040 0,005 88,16 11,84 1995 0,123 0,084 0,040 67,83 32,17
1996 0,057 0,050 0,007 87,04 12,96 1996 0,157 0,122 0,035 77,87 22,14
1997 0,053 0,046 0,008 85,58 14,43 1997 0,112 0,082 0,030 73,02 26,98
1998 0,071 0,058 0,013 81,26 18,74 1998 0,124 0,088 0,036 70,84 29,16
1999 0,072 0,050 0,022 69,13 30,87 1999 0,124 0,096 0,028 77,42 22,58
2000 0,071 0,045 0,026 63,45 36,55 2000 0,174 0,154 0,021 88,13 11,87



















1993 0,121 0,081 0,040 66,91 33,09 1993 0,084 0,070 0,014 83,04 16,96
1994 0,115 0,067 0,048 58,40 41,60 1994 0,071 0,058 0,013 82,04 17,96
1995 0,092 0,059 0,033 64,14 35,86 1995 0,074 0,059 0,014 80,56 19,44
1996 0,091 0,056 0,036 60,91 39,09 1996 0,082 0,071 0,011 86,55 13,45
1997 0,101 0,067 0,034 66,40 33,60 1997 0,068 0,059 0,008 87,51 12,49
1998 0,075 0,037 0,039 48,94 51,06 1998 0,084 0,074 0,009 88,79 11,21
1999 0,106 0,044 0,061 42,04 57,96 1999 0,098 0,072 0,026 73,92 26,08
2000 0,133 0,045 0,088 33,75 66,24 2000 0,110 0,089 0,021 81,04 18,95












total Theil index 
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5. Conclusions 
The progress of financial integration in Europe is undeniable, but unequal. Some 
of its more visible results can be seen in the reduction of interest rates -associated with 
the reduction in inflation and with the rest of the nominal convergence objectives with 
which the road to monetary union was paved- and in the convergence of the interest 
rates in the public debt markets and in the markets of the most standardised banking 
products (time deposits and mortgage loans to households). Less conclusive are the 
results in the retail banking markets in which the direct relationships with the client 
make several of the defining characteristics of the banking activity more relevant but 
also where the differentiation of the services and control of market power are more 
easily obtained. 
The analysis of the relative margins of banking companies also indicates that 
margins are higher in retail banking. Given that the margins are obtained as a 
differential between prices and marginal costs, there might appear to be greater costs in 
the margins if the effects on the interest rates associated with the peculiarities of the 
banking operations with clients have not previously been discounted. If dealing with 
operation costs, then this would in fact be the case, and the levels and trajectories of the 
margins would confirm that market power exits and is maintained. However, if we 
consider it possible that such costs (information and supervision costs, idiosyncratic 
risks of the clients and of the operations) are not computed by the estimated cost 
function and that they will appear as a risk cost ex post, in the last rows of the profit and 
loss accounts, the doubts surrounding the cause of the behaviour of the margins remain, 
as an increase of margins does not necessarily imply a reduction in competition. 
In any case, the fact that margin inequality is due in no small measure to 
differences between countries and that this inequality is even greater within those 
groups whose specialisation is more orientated towards retail banking would tend to 
indicate that entry barriers between the different national banking systems continue to 
exist, derived of regulations, cultural differences or of the strengthening of customer 
relations by means of sentiments of national identity. This implies that in order for any 
potential results of financial integration to appear it will be necessary not only to 
progress in the homogenisation of regulation frameworks but also in other areas of 
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